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The literature on aid effectiveness has focused more on recipient policies than the 
determinants of aid allocation yet a consistent result is that political allies obtain 
more aid from donors than non-allies. This paper shows that aid allocated to 
political allies is ineffective for growth, whereas aid extended to countries that are 
not allies is highly effective. The result appears to be robust across different 
specifications and estimation techniques. In particular, new methods are 
employed to control for endogeneity. The paper suggests that aid allocation 
should be scrutinized carefully to make aid as effective as possible. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After a dip in the late 1990s, bilateral foreign aid, graphed in Figure 1, has risen significantly in 
recent years.
2 But its effectiveness in terms of enhancing recipient economic performance 
remains controversial. While much of the extensive literature on the effectiveness of aid to 
enhance growth finds a positive effect, there are several notable papers that find no effect or even 
a negative relation. Much attention has been focused on aid-effectiveness conditional on 
recipient policies and the attractive idea that aid may be effective if combined with good policies 
adopted by recipient countries. Surprisingly, less attention has been paid to the results and 
implications of the aid allocation literature. A consistent result therein is that politics matters, or 
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Figure 1. Bilateral Foreign Aid to Developing Countries
 
In this paper, we suggest that if politics matters for aid allocation, perhaps it also matters 
for aid effectiveness. One idea is that aid may be used to obtain political allegiance. This view 
reverses the standard causality of the aid allocation results. If aid is used to buy political 
allegiance it is likely that there will be less concern regarding the effectiveness of that aid for 
enhancing economic performance. A second view is that aid to political allies may be more tied 
in other dimensions than aid to non-allies. Political allegiance is likely to go hand in hand with a 
closer relationship in general, and hence recipients may feel they should (or are pressured to) buy 
                                                 
2 Data from the OECD’s Official Development Assistance database.   6
more goods and services from donors—typically financed by that aid. Both views suggest that 
aid between allies may be less effective than aid between non-allies. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we believe that this is the first paper to 
disaggregate aid specifically taking into account a basic result of the aid allocation literature: that 
politics matters. In particular, we employ OECD data from 22 donors to a wide range of 
recipients for 24 years and split aid into aid between political allies and aid between non-allies 
using voting patterns in the UN general assembly. Second, taking into account this 
disaggregation, we focus our methodology on controlling for problems of endogeneity and for 
the likely medium to long-run impact of aid on growth. Aid between allies is explained well by 
deeper exogenous variables that have been used frequently in the literature such as a previous 
colonial relationship, common language or a formal political alliance. However, to explain aid 
between non-allies we find that other instruments explain the relevant aid patterns. We suggest 
that our instrumentation strategy provides a better explanation for the different patterns of aid 
than in previous work evidenced by the results of tests on instrument validity. Using a variety of 
specifications and estimation techniques we find robust and striking results. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss relevant aspects of the 
aid allocation and the aid effectiveness literature. In Section 3 we explain the methodologies 
adopted, and Section 4 contains the main results. In Section 5 we provide conclusions, focusing 
on the implications of our results. 
 
2. Motivation  
 
There is a small but growing literature on the determinants of aid allocation. Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) first suggested that politics is an important determinant of aid for some donors. On the 
other hand, Chong (2006) suggests that donor characteristics including tax revenues and donor 
income inequality are important determinants of aid allocation. Powell and Bobba (2006) finds 
that politics, recipient characteristics and donor characteristics all play a role in explaining aid 
patterns. In particular, this paper confirms the result that countries tend to receive more aid from 
donors if they are allied politically and less if they are not political allies of donors.
3 
 
                                                 
3 The paper follows the literature in using voting in the UN general assembly to measure political alignment.   7
The extensive literature on aid effectiveness has tended to focus more on recipient 
characteristics than donor characteristics or ties between the two, and has paid little attention to 
determinants of the pattern of aid as potential explanations of aid effectiveness.
4  Excellent 
reviews of the aid effectiveness literature are included in Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004), 
Hansen and Tarp (1999) and Cassens (1994) to name but three. The first and most recent review 
cited, considers the work of Boone (see Boone 1994) as central in sparking an industry of growth 
regressions. Boone found that aid was largely ineffective in enhancing growth. A series of papers 
including Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 
Islam (2003) and Ovaska (2003) then argued that aid is effective, but conditional on recipient 
characteristics. Relevant characteristics include inflation, budget balance, openness, an overall 
indices of the quality of policies and institutions, warfare, totalitarian government and economic 
freedom.  However, there has been a lively debate regarding the robustness of these results; see 
especially the contributions by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) and (2004). 
On the other hand, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) disaggregate aid and suggest 
that only certain types of aid are likely to be effective in promoting growth. They also  favor a 
non-linear effect of aid on growth and find that, accounting for diminishing returns, aid tends to 
be effective independently of recipient policies. Finally, they stress that most aid can only be 
expected to have effects on growth over the medium to longer run.
5   
The underlying problem of endogeneity is that while aid may affect recipient economic 
performance, that performance may well affect the quantity of aid received. Rajan and 
Subramajan (2005) argue in favor of a careful treatment of this issue, and their results take the 
literature right back to Boone. The conclusion is that, when including instruments that explain 
the pattern of aid but that are unrelated to recipient performance, aid is not effective for growth. 
However, the consistent result that donors extend more aid to recipients that are political 
allies than to other countries, leads us to question whether aid to political allies may have a 
different nature than aid to non-allies. There are at least two broad justifications for thinking that 
aid between political allies may be different than aid between non-allies. The first is that aid may 
be used to influence recipient countries. This explanation would reverse the causality considered 
                                                 
4 See for example Radelet’s primer on aid (Radelet 2006a) where he states “to date there has been very little 
systematic research connecting specific donor practices to aid effectiveness.” 
5 These results underline the idea that aid may come in different flavors and hence suggest that a somewhat richer 
instrumentation strategy than otherwise may be required to do justice in explaining aid patterns.   8
in the aid allocation literature.
6 If some aid is used to buy political allegiance then there may be 
less emphasis on ensuring that that aid is effective for growth.
7 A second view is that aid that is 
extended to political allies may be more tied in other dimensions than aid to non-allies.   
Specifically, if political allegiance implies a closer relation between donor and recipient in 
general then recipients may either feel that they should (or be forced to) buy goods or services 
from the donor country (typically financed by the aid) whether they be of the highest quality or 
not.
8 In both cases, our hypothesis is that aid extended to political allies may be rendered less 
effective for growth. 
To some extent, using instruments to control for endogeneity may indirectly harness the 
determinants of aid allocation to explain aid effectiveness. The time-invariant instruments 
employed by Rajan and Subramajan (2005) include whether a country was a colony of a donor, 
whether there is a common language between recipient and donor and whether the countries had 
entered into a political alliance. While these variables appear to be adequate instruments for total 
aid by standard tests, we suspect that they will explain better aid to political allies rather than aid 
to non-allies. We suggest here that the more altruistic donor characteristics suggested by Chong 
(2006), including the equality of donor societies and the size of tax revenues, may better explain 
aid to non-allies.  
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to separate aid to political allies from aid to non 
allies. As in previous papers, we use the voting correlations in the UN general assembly to 
measure political allegiance. Specifically, we use an indicator variable for the voting behavior of 
the countries in our database developed by Voeten (2005). Whenever a country votes in favor of 
a resolution that attracts a 1, if it abstains a 2 and when it votes against then the value is 3. We 
then calculate the correlation coefficient between each donor-recipient pair for each year of our 
sample.  In Figure 2, we plot the distribution of the correlation of UN voting for selected donors. 
As can be seen from the graph different donors have different distributions. The United States 
                                                 
6 Much of the literature on aid allocation established the correlation between these variables but not necessarily the 
causality. 
7 In the general direction of this view, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) argue that recipient countries that are members 
of the UN security council obtain more US foreign aid. 
8 The OECD data on aid splits aid into tied, partially tied and untied according to the destination of each loan or 
grant. However, there is some controversy and skepticism regarding the quality of this disaggregation and hence we 
were unwilling to employ this variable directly; see Roodman (2004) for a discussion. Still, the correlation between 
aid to political allies and the OECD tied aid series is 0.7 providing some support for the view that aid between allies 
may be more tied in other dimensions too.    9
and Switzerland have distributions with wide dispersion reflecting that they have many allies 
among potential aid recipients but also that there are many potential recipients that vote against 
them at the United Nations. The United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark have distributions with 


















































































Figure 2. Frequency Domains for UN Alignment across Recipients
for Various Donors
Denmark Norway UK US Switzerland
 
To be as clean and objective as possible, we simply considered two countries that 
displayed a voting correlation greater than the overall sample median in a particular year as allies 
for that period, whereas if the correlation was less than the median then they are considered as 
non-allies.
9 Splitting aid in this manner implies that about 49 percent of the volume of aid was 
extended to political allies across our sample. In Figure 3, we plot total aid extended and aid 
extended to political allies, both as a percentage of donor GDP. In general, countries that extend 
                                                 
9 We have tested the sensitivity of our results to the choice of this threshold for our splitting rule. In particular, we 
chose the 33
rd and 66
th percentile of the distribution of UN voting as alternative thresholds. Results are shown in 
Appendix 2.    10
a larger share of aid as a percentage of GDP extend less aid to allies. Greece gives the largest 
proportion of aid to allies, followed by Switzerland and then New Zealand and Australia. 
Countries that give little aid to allies as a proportion of total aid include Ireland, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom.  



















































3. Data and Methodology 
 
The data on aid are drawn from the OECD database on Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
These data cover aid extended from 22 donors to a wide number of individual recipient 
countries.
10 In the analyses that follow we consider net flows. As discussed above, an important 
consideration is whether aid has a long-run or a medium-run impact on growth. In order to seek 
robustness we decided to consider both possibilities. We employ a cross-section with time-
averages and to maximize the consistency of the panel we choose to consider the period 1980-
2003 inclusive. We believe a 24-year period should be sufficient to capture the effects of aid on 
                                                 
10 A caveat is that we do not consider aid from countries that are not members of the OECD. China, for example, has 
become an important source of finance for several developing countries.   11
growth, and over this period we can include some 133 recipient countries.
11 However, we also 
employ a panel analysis. Here we calculate five-year averages to consider what might be termed 
medium-run impacts, and to maximize the information used we consider the all the information 
available 1970-2003 and use unbalanced panel techniques. In the following subsections we 
discuss instrumentation strategies to control for endogeneity and provide further detail on the 
estimation techniques used to consider the medium and longer term impact of aid on growth.   
 
3.1. Tackling Endogeneity: Instrumentation Strategies 
 
Our methodology for addressing endogeneity follows Frankel and Romer (1999) and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005), however the crucial difference compared to the latter paper is that we split 
aid into aid between allies and aid to non-allies and choose instruments accordingly. We believe 
that this not only allows us to estimate separate coefficients for what may be potentially different 
effects of different types of aid, but also improves dramatically the statistical quality of the 
instrumentation strategy. 
For aid between allies we employ similar instruments to those used by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005). However, here we also take into account the results from Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) and Powell and Bobba (2006) that different donors may behave differently. We 
therefore introduce interaction terms between some of the explanatory variables and country 
dummies such that, for example, the effect of a recipient being a colony may differ across 
donors. Specifically, we derive our instrument for Allies’ Aid from the following regression for 
the bilateral (donor-recipient) aid allocation decision,  
 
(1) ijt t j ij i ij ijt ijt COMMLANG DONOR COLONY ENTENTE ε ν η γ δ β α ϑ + + + + + + = *  
 
where  ijt ϑ  is the share of donor i’s aid allocated to recipient j at time t if recipient j is an ally. 
ENTENTE is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the donor and recipient are common members 
of an entente or alliance in any given time period.
12 COLONY and COMMLANG are dummies 
representing, respectively, a former colonial relationship and common language between donor 
and recipient.  j η  are recipient country dummies that control for other unobservable factors that 
                                                 
11 For some countries the data go back to 1970, and we exploit these additional data using an unbalanced panel 
below. 
12 See Appendix 1 for description and sources.   12
might affect aid allocation decision,  and  t ν  are time dummies controlling for potential common 
trends.
13   
We derive our instrument for aid between non-allies using the following equation, 
 
(2)     ijt t ij it it it ijt dTAXREV cGINI bGDP a ε ν η σ + + + + + + =  
 
where  ijt σ  is the share of recipient j’s aid received from donor i at time t where i is not a political 
ally. The explanatory variables are now the donor characteristics, as proposed by Chong (2006), 
that represent more altruistic determinants for aid and are hence excellent candidates for 
explaining aid allocations to non-allies.  
We have a bilateral (donor-recipient) panel data set with five-year intervals spanning the 
period 1970-2003.  Estimation results of equation (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1 and 2. 
Viewing Table 1, the reader will note that all variables are highly statistically significant and 
display the expected signs; between them they account for a substantial share (56 percent) of the 
variation in donor allocation decision of aid to allies. In Table 2 we see donor size and tax 
revenues are significant determinants of the amount of aid received by non-allies.
14  
 
                                                 
 
14 We estimate equation with bilateral (donor-recipient) fixed effects; nevertheless when we take the predicted value 
we only consider the portion of variation explained by our regressors.   13
 
Table 1. Modeling Aid to Allies  
Dependent variable is the share of donor i's aid allocated to recipient j at time t 
 (1)  (2) 
 (1970-2003)  (1980-2003) 
    
Dummy for common Membership in Entente Alliance  0.003  0.007 
 (1.23)  (2.21)** 
Dummy for Egypt  0.045  0.055 
 (8.84)***  (10.77)*** 
egyptUSA 0.156  0.145 
 (102.93)*** (92.00)*** 
israel -0.000  0.001 
 (0.04)  (0.27) 
israelUSA 0.171  0.197 
 (113.76)*** (125.01)*** 
colony 0.001  0.001 
 (4.47)***  (2.93)*** 
colonyAUS 0.007  0.006 
 (93.82)***  (60.83)*** 
colonyBEL 0.004  0.003 
 (2.56)**  (2.52)** 
colonyGBR -0.000  -0.000 
 (4.15)***  (3.33)*** 
colonyITA 0.001  0.001 
 (20.71)***  (15.93)*** 
colonyJPN 0.002  0.000 
 (21.37)***  (2.82)*** 
colonyNLD 0.002  0.001 
 (4.49)***  (8.40)*** 
colonyNZL 0.001  0.001 
 (16.95)***  (13.88)*** 
colonyPRT 0.001  0.001 
 (17.95)***  (13.67)*** 
comlang 0.007  0.008 
 (4.32)***  (5.23)*** 
Constant 0.003  -0.000 
 (0.50)  (0.04) 
Observations 6627  4685 
R-squared 0.56  0.56 
Time effects  yes  yes 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
   14
 
Table 2. Modeling Aid to Non-Allies 
Dependent variable is the share of recipient j's aid received 
from donor i at time t. 
 (1)  (2) 
 (1970-2003)  (1980-2003) 
    
Log(GDP of Donor)  0.197  0.144 
 (5.69)***  (4.01)*** 
Gini Coefficient in Donor  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.84)  (0.50) 
Tax Revenues  0.003  0.002 
 (3.21)***  (2.27)** 
Constant -1.878  -1.406 
 (5.56)***  (3.95)*** 
Observations 4926  4370 
Number of id  1642  1632 
Donor-Recipient fixed effect  yes  yes 
Time effects  yes  yes 
R-squared (within variation)  0.04  0.01 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The crucial exclusion restriction here is that historical and political connections between 
donors and recipients that explain aid to allies and donors’ characteristics that explain aid to non-
allies are uncorrelated with recipient country economic performances. This identification 
assumption seems highly plausible to us, as the non time-variant and historical links (explanatory 
variables in equation 1) and donor characteristics (explanatory variables equation 2) are unlikely 
to affect directly economic growth in recipient countries. 
We then compute the predicted values from these first stages and aggregate across donors 
























ˆ ϑ , and we 
compute the instrumented allies’ aid to GDP ratio with the following aggregation formula: 
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ˆ σ , and we compute the 
instrumented Non-allies’ aid to GDP ratio with the following aggregation formula: 
 



















These computations then allow us to estimate growth equations using the above as instruments. 
For example, we can estimate a panel growth regression of the following form,    




















+ + = −1  
 
where  1 − it y  is the conditional convergence term, namely the initial level of income per capita and 
CONTROLS is a vector of standard growth determinants. We may then instrument the terms 
including AlliesAid and NonAlliesAid using the instruments derived above from equations (3) 
and (4). 
Besides exogeneity, another concern with our instruments is that there may be other 
variables in the vector CONTROLS such as GDP per capita, institutions or economic policies that 
drive the correlation between the actual values of AlliesAid and NonAlliesAid Aid and their fitted 
values estimated from equations (3) and (4), respectively. Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the 
conditional relationship between AlliesAid and NonAlliesAid Non-Allies’ Aid and their relative 
instruments, conditional on all the covariates that enter into equation (5). The charts illustrate the 
very strong conditional relationship between the two types of aid and their fitted values with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.87 and 0.80 and T-statistics of 6.23 and 18.7, respectively. The 
conclusion is that the instruments appear to contain a great deal of information regarding the 
actual values.   16
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There has been a substantial debate in the literature regarding the appropriate estimation 
of equation (5). There are perhaps three main methodological caveats. The first refers to a 
standard problem of growth empirics, namely the fact that the equation is dynamic due to the 
conditional convergence term, hence any attempt to control for the problem of unobservable 
heterogeneity by incorporating country fixed effects would produce inconsistent estimates. One 
way to overcome this problem is averaging the data over the whole period and estimating a pure 
cross-section; alternatively, one can estimate the equation in a panel with a pooled OLS 
estimator and hence without specifying the fixed effects. Both estimators have the drawback that 
we can never be sure whether we are controlling for all possible ways in which countries might 
differ. A further possibility is to employ the Blundell-Bond GMM system estimator. This 
estimator addresses both the problem of the endogeneity of standard growth controls (through 
the use of instruments and corresponding moment restrictions) and implicitly incorporates fixed 
effects.
15 
The second caveat refers to the time horizon at which it is appropriate to evaluate the 
effect of aid on economic growth. While much of the literature studies the aid-growth 
relationship over the shorter run (with a panel dataset of time windows ranging from three to five  
years), others stress that the impact of aid on economic performance will likely take longer to 
materialize, and hence growth equations with cross-sectional averages taken over longer time 
horizons may be more appropriate.
16 
The third concern is model specification, particularly the choice of controls. Temple 
(1999) summarizes several widespread concerns regarding the fragility of cross-country growth 
regressions. More specifically, Roodman (2004) tests the robustness of the relationship between 
aid and growth by replicating and assessing the validity of the most influential studies in the 
literature and performing a number of specification tests. He concludes that the results are indeed 
fragile. However, he does not split aid according to the results of the aid allocation literature.   
Given these methodological issues, we present estimates of equation (5) using i) time average 
cross sections (OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS) over the whole period, ii) a pooled panel OLS estimator 
using 5 year time averages and again employing with OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimators, and iii) 
                                                 
15 Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) argue, based on Monte Carlo simulations, and taking account of all the advantages and 
limitations of the different estimation procedures, that the pure cross-section OLS estimator that averages data over 
long periods is the most inefficient. However, their simulations do not consider the Blundell-Bond estimator.  
16 Again see Clemens et al. (2004) for a review of this point.   18
using the Blundell Bond GMM system estimator with the same five-year-averages panel dataset 
and with alternative instrument sets. Given the issues regarding the fragility of controls, we first 
chose controls that may be considered as exogenous and that have been used in the literature—in  
particular by Rajan and Subramanian (2005)—and then performed several experiments in terms 
of dropping controls or replacing them with other variants, perhaps more susceptible to criticisms 
of endogeneity, and found that the results are robust to these variations.
17 In the following section 




4.1. The Long-Run Effect of Aid on Growth: Cross-Sectional Evidence 
 
Table 3 summarizes our main results for the cross section estimation of equation (5) averaging 
data over the period 1980-2003.
18 The standard set of controls includes initial per capita income 
(in log), a measure of institutional quality (the ICRG index from the World Bank), measures of 
geography, which are a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa and the fraction of the country’s area in 
the tropics, and external shocks represented by the average growth and variability of the terms of 
trade. Column 1 employs total aid (as a percentage of recipient GDP) rather than splitting aid 
into that between allies and non-allies, the relative estimated coefficient is not significant. In 
column 2 we control for potential endogeneity of this variable, and we find the relative estimated 
coefficient to be negative and marginally significant. These results confirm the main findings of 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) of no aggregate relationship between aid and growth or possibly 
even a negative relationship. 
In Columns 3-7 we split total aid as a percentage of GDP into aid to allies and aid to non-
allies and we test the robustness of our results by employing alternative estimators and 
instrumentation strategies. The results are striking. Aid between allies is always negative for 
growth, while aid between non-allies is always positive and significant in explaining growth. 
This result holds in a simple OLS (Column 3) and across various 2SLS estimators that employ 
alternative instrument sets. Our preferred estimator is the one in Column 6 in which both aid 
                                                 
17 See Appendix 3. 
18 We also  tested robustness by considering a shorter time average; see Appendix 4 for these results.   19
between allies and between non allies are instrumented with their respective fitted values derived 
from equations (1) and (2).
19  
 
Table 3. Cross Section Analysis for Period 1980-2003   
(Dependent Variable is average annual growth rate of per capita GDP) 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Model  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  System  of  eq
            
Total Aid(% GDP)  -0.803  -1.587           
 (1.95)*  (1.67)*           
NonAlliesAid(% GDP)     1.765  1.618  1.985 1.912  1.780 
     (2.19)**  (2.19)**  (2.48)** (2.22)**  (1.84)* 
AlliesAid(% GDP)      -5.956 -5.790  -6.533  -6.539  -6.914 
     (3.66)***  (3.75)***  (3.43)*** (3.45)*** (3.99)*** 
log(Initial Per Capita GDP)  -0.083  -0.091 -0.096 -0.096  -0.098 -0.098  -0.101 
  (3.62)*** (3.92)*** (4.45)*** (4.77)*** (4.75)*** (4.80)***  (6.00)*** 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan 
Africa  -0.135 -0.124 -0.163 -0.162 -0.166  -0.165  -0.162 
  (3.70)*** (3.57)*** (4.86)*** (5.13)*** (5.22)*** (5.12)***  (5.04)*** 
Institutional quality (ICRG 
Index)  0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011  0.011 
  (3.24)*** (3.59)*** (3.61)*** (3.88)*** (3.92)*** (3.93)***  (5.51)*** 
Fraction of area in the tropics  -0.017 -0.009 0.026  0.025 0.031  0.031  0.034 
  (0.44) (0.24) (0.65) (0.67) (0.78)  (0.79)  (0.96) 
Terms of Trade Growth  0.215  0.205 0.121 0.125  0.109 0.109  0.102 
  (1.41) (1.43) (0.82) (0.91) (0.78)  (0.78)  (0.84) 
St. deviation of Terms of 
Trade Growth  -0.038 -0.028 -0.062 -0.060 -0.063  -0.062  -0.060 
  (0.96) (0.71) (1.51) (1.58) (1.61)  (1.58)  (1.16) 
Constant  0.144 0.187 0.199 0.199  0.205  0.208  0.220 
  (1.11) (1.52) (1.57) (1.70)* (1.72)*  (1.76)*  (1.72)* 
Observations  67 67 65 65  65  65  65 
R-squared 0.44  0.40  0.53 0.53  0.53  0.56   
Instrumented Variables    Total Aid































 and Fitted 
NonAlliesAid 
F Test of Excluded iv    8.12    193.71  27.56     
Craigg-Donald Test for Weak 
iv         53.81   
Robust t statistics in 
parentheses            
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
                                                 
19 Note that the correlation between aid to allies and to non-allies is only 0.46. Moreover, the correlation between the 
fitted values of aid between allies and non-allies estimated from equations 1 and 2 is around zero. We conclude that 
these results are not driven by any high positive correlations between the regressors. See Appendix 5 for the 
correlation matrix.   20
We have also performed several tests to evaluate the statistical quality of instruments and 
reported the relevant test statistics in Table 3. We note that the instrument of total aid relevant for 
Column 2 seems to perform weakly in terms of the conditional correlation with its respective 
actual value; this is not surprising given that, in this case, in the first stage of aid allocation we 
regressed total aid on historical and political factors that are unlikely to explain the overall 
pattern of aid extended to every donor. On the other hand, when we split aid into aid between 
allies and aid to non-allies and use these values as dependent variables in our aid allocation 
equations (1) and (2), the relative performance of the resulting fitted values is outstanding.
20 
Finally, the model of Column 7 employs a 3SLS full information estimator that estimates 
equation (5) together with its two first stages in a system of equations. Besides this different 
estimation technique, here we are imposing the restriction that the two types of aid do not 
interact with each other in the first stages.
21 The results are again fully consistent with those in 
columns 3-6. 
Also note that the all the controls are significant, with signs and magnitude in accordance 
with the literature, with the exception of the external shocks variable, which is not significant.  
 
4.2 The Medium-Run Effect of Aid on Growth: Evidence Using Panel Data 
 
Here we employ a panel dataset employing five-year time windows spanning the period 1970-
2003. Since we are trying to explain shorter-run growth dynamics, the set of controls employed 
differs from the one in the cross section of Table 3 and include initial per capita income (in log), 
the inflation rate (in log), an openness index and the same measures of geography and 
institutional quality employed above. Table 4 displays estimation results of a pooled OLS model 
without fixed effects across the same estimators of Table 3. With respect to our coefficients of 
interest, the results are very similar to the one in the cross-section and confirm our main findings. 
Total aid as a percentage of GDP has a non-significant impact on growth, whereas when we split 
this term into aid between allies and aid to non-allies we find the former negative and the latter 
positive and significant. Again, the results are robust across various estimators and instrument 
sets. 
                                                 
20 On weak instruments see Stock and Wright (2000) and Stock and Yogo (2004). When we split aid into aid 
between allies and non-allies, the instruments employed produce test statistics that exceed by far the critical values 
proposed in this literature. 
21 Namely, we drop the non-allies’ aid  term from the allies’ aid first-stage equation and the allies’ aid term from the 
non-allies’ aid first-stage equation.    21
 
Table 4. Panel Analysis for Period 1970-2003   
(Dependent Variable is average annual growth rate of per capita GDP) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Model  OLS 2SLS OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  System  of  eq 
             
Total Aid(% GDP)  0.083  -0.867           
 (0.23)  (0.96)           
NonAlliesAid(% GDP)      1.618  2.511  2.587  3.032  2.946 
     (2.21)** (2.65)***  (2.54)**  (2.80)***  (3.53)*** 
AlliesAid(% GDP)      -2.906 -3.983  -5.403  -5.088  -5.804 
     (1.58)  (2.24)**  (2.24)**  (2.16)**  (3.51)*** 
log(Initial Per Capita 
GDP)  -0.013 -0.029 -0.029  -0.028 -0.029 -0.022  -0.022 
  (0.54) (1.22) (1.17)  (1.18)  (1.13)  (0.82)  (0.79) 
log(inflation)  -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013  -0.011  -0.012  -0.014 
 (1.75)*  (1.52)  (1.73)*  (1.82)*  (1.55)  (1.63)  (1.37) 
Openness  Index  -0.036 -0.022 -0.041 -0.044  -0.053  -0.061  -0.056 
  (0.97) (0.64) (1.11)  (1.18)  (1.43)  (1.62)  (1.50) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan 
Africa  -0.102 -0.084 -0.131  -0.142 -0.121 -0.131  -0.127 
 (2.36)**  (1.91)*  (3.19)*** (3.53)***  (3.35)***  (3.58)***  (3.03)*** 
Institutional quality (ICRG 
Index)  0.008 0.008 0.010  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.010 
 (4.32)***  (4.52)*** (4.76)*** (5.00)***  (6.01)***  (5.91)***  (4.99)*** 
Fraction of area in the 
tropics  -0.043 -0.041 -0.012  -0.006  0.018  0.018  0.021 
  (0.98) (0.96) (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.52) 
Constant  -0.233 -0.100 -0.186 -0.166  -0.261  -0.320  -0.259 
  (1.08) (0.49) (0.84)  (0.71)  (1.18)  (1.38)  (1.28) 
Observations  243 243 192  191  157  156  156 
R-squared 0.31  0.29  0.33 0.32  0.33  0.33   
Instrumented Variables    Total Aid

























 and Fitted 
NonAlliesAid 
Fitted AlliesAid
 and Fitted 
NonAlliesAid 
F Test of Excluded iv    7.90    156.25  119.06     
Craigg-Donald Test for 
Weak  iv         79.69   
Robust t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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As discussed above, estimating a panel without fixed effects has the key drawback that it 
does not control for unobservable heterogeneity across countries. An alternative and arguably 
superior approach that controls for potential endogeneity of the regressors and introduces fixed 
effects is the Blundell-Bond GMM system estimator.
22 This estimation technique allows us to 
specify two different types of instruments: the so-called “internal instruments” (i.e., past levels 
and differences of the endogenous regressors together with contemporaneous values of strictly 
exogenous variables), and “external instruments” (i.e., exogenous variables that do not enter into 
the growth equation and whose contemporaneous values are used as instruments). 
In this case, we employ the lagged values of explanatory variables as internal 
instruments, as is standard, including measures of economic policies (GDP per capita, inflation 
and trade openness) together with the lagged actual values of aid to allies and aid to non-allies. 
To create a second instrument set we also add as external instruments the fitted values of aid 
derived from aid allocation equations (1) and (2). Given that these are derived from more clearly 
exogenous variables we anticipate that this second instrument will be superior. 
Table 5 shows our main results of estimation of equation (5) with the same set of controls 
of the previous panel estimation. The models in columns 1 and 2 use total aid as the dependent 
variable (as a percentage of recipient GDP) and the estimated coefficient is not significant 
regardless of the instrument set used. This mirrors are results above and several papers in the 
literature that aid is not effective for growth. In columns 3 and 4 however we split the aid term 
into aid to allies and aid to non-allies and compare the results for the two alternative instrument 
sets. When only internal instruments are used (column 3) then both aid terms appear non-
significant, whereas when we employ internal and add external instruments (namely the fitted 
values of aid to allies and aid to non allies from equations 1 and 2 respectively) we confirm our 
previous finding that aid to allies has a negative impact on growth while aid to non-allies appears 
positive and significant. We interpret these findings as further evidence that, once we address the 
issue of endogeneity appropriately, by taking into account how aid is allocated, politics matters 
for aid effectiveness.  
                                                 
22 Within the range of GMM estimators for dynamic panel models, we prefer the Blundell-Bond system estimator, 
that stacks the levels and the difference equations together in a system, precisely as it allows us to incorporate fixed 
effects even though we also have time invariant regressors, but also when compared to say the Arellano-Bond 
estimator, which considers only the difference equation, the Blundell-Bond estimator appears to do better in terms of 
efficiency and less bias when there are relatively few individuals as is typical in cross country regressions; see Bond 
et al. (2001).   23
Table 5. Panel GMM for Period 1970-2003   
(Dependent Variable is average annual growth rate of per capita GDP) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model  SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM  SYS GMM 
growth rate (t-1)  0.843  0.856  0.960  0.879 
 (7.14)***  (7.44)***  (7.62)***  (8.50)*** 
Total Aid(% GDP)  -0.023  -0.240     
 (0.08)  (0.60)     
NonAlliesAid(% GDP)      0.161  1.24 
     (0.24)  (2.86)*** 
AlliesAid(% GDP)      -0.501  -1.78 
     (0.32)  (1.83)* 
log(Initial Per Capita GDP)  -0.139  -0.106  -0.159  -0.125 
 (2.59)***  (2.04)**  (2.69)***  (2.14)** 
log(inflation) 0.014  0.014  0.005  0.004 
 (1.36)  (1.40)  (0.45)  (0.39) 
Openness Index  0.015  0.036  0.018  -0.001 
 (0.29)  (0.73)  (0.34)  (0.02) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.119  -0.081  -0.143  -0.154 
 (2.17)**  (1.49)  (2.18)**  (2.77)*** 
Institutional quality (ICRG Index)  0.019  0.017  0.018  0.017 
 (5.68)***  (5.65)***  (5.18)***  (4.91)*** 
Fraction of area in the tropics -0.048  -0.042  -0.028  -0.024 
 (1.42)  (1.20)  (0.82)  (0.73) 
Constant 0.129  -0.050  0.387  0.185 
 (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.97)  (0.50) 
Observations 242  242  191  155 
Number of id  66  66  63  63 









Tied Aid, Untied 






Exogenous variables used as Instruments  
Rajan et al 
Fitted Aid(% 
GDP) 
  Both Fitted Tied
 and Untied Aid
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (p-value) 0.17  0.15  0.48  0.37 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first diff  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first diff  0.92  1.00  0.71  0.74 
Robust z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have revisited the debate on whether foreign aid is effective in enhancing 
economic performance in recipient countries and in particular in spurring growth. Our main 
hypothesis is that the way aid is allocated is important in determining aid effectiveness. A 
consistent result of the aid allocation literature is that politics matters and hence it seems natural 
to question whether politics also matters for aid effectiveness. 
Our main finding is that aid extended to non-allies has a strong positive impact on 
recipient countries’ economic growth, whereas aid to political allies has a negative impact. These 
results are robust across different samples, model specifications, time horizons, estimators and 
instrumentation strategies. While there are always caveats that must accompany any empirical 
analysis of this nature, our results do appear to be striking in terms of both quantitative impact 
and robustness. In particular, we feel our instruments more adequately explain the pattern of aid 
than standard donor-recipient time-invariant factors that may explain the pattern of aid between 
allies but not between non-allies. We remain agnostic regarding the precise mechanism behind 
our results but consider two likely possibilities supported by additional evidence: i) aid is used to 
buy political allegiance and hence its effectiveness for growth may be at best a secondary 
consideration, and ii) aid between allies may be more tied in other dimensions than aid between 
non-allies. 
These results carry strong policy conclusions. They show that foreign aid can be very 
beneficial to economic development around the world independent of recipient policies. Indeed, 
the results stress the role played by donors rather than by recipients. This emphasis stands in 
contrast to much of the recent debate regarding aid effectiveness, which has focused on recipient 
policies. We suggest here that donors’ allocation policies should be seen as a leading determinant 
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 Category Variable Description Scale Source Notes
Total Aid (% GDP)
ODA net flows as percentage 
of GDP in PPP
 percent
OECD, 2005. Geographical 
Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Aid Recipient
The Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
includes grants or loans to countries and territories on 
Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing 
countries) which are : - undertaken by the official sector; -
with promotion of economic development and welfare as 
the main objective. - at concessional financial terms (if a 
loan, have a grant element of at least 25 per cent). 
Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are 
excluded.
AlliesAid(%  GDP)
Aid extended from each donor 
to recipients with UN voting 
correlation above the sample 
median
percent
Authors computation using 
OECD data
NonAlliedAid(% GDP)
Aid extended from each donor 
to recipients with UN voting 
correlation below the sample 
median
percent
Authors computation using 
OECD data
growth GDPPC 
Annual difference of natural 
log of Gross Domestic Product 
per capita in constant 2000 
price
percent
Authors computation using 
WDI data
political allignment with 
donors
Annual correlation of voting 
records in UNGA between 
recipient and donor
natural units in (-1,1) 
interval
Erik Voeten,  Political 
Science and International 
Affairs.
Votes were recorded at each UN General Assembly 
according to the following criterion: 1 Yes, 2 Abstain, 3 
No, 8 Absent, 9 Not a Member. Linear correlation 
coefficent between donor and recipient voting patterns is 
then computed for each year.
colony
Number of years as a colony 
of donor since 1900
natural units
ICOW Colonial History data 
set
egypt dummy variable for Egypt binary 0-1 WDI
israel dummy variable for Israel binary 0-1 WDI
Common Language
dummy=1 if donor and 








Gross Domestic Product  in 
constant international price
natural log PWT
Gini Coefficient Gini Index of Income Inequality
natural units in (0,1) 
interval
WIDER, United Nations
Tax Revenues (% GDP)




International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Index of 
Institutional Quality




Initial Period Gross Domestic 




Sachs and Warner Index of 
Trade Openness
natural units in (0,1) 
interval
Sachs and Warner (1995), 
updated by Tabellini et al 
(2005)
A country is rated as an open economy according to the 
foollowing four criteria: (1) average tariff rates below 40 
%, (2) average quota and licencing coverage of imports 
of less than 40 %, (3) black market exchange rate 
premium that averaged less than 20 % and (4) no 
extreme controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on 
exports 
Fraction of area in the 
tropics
The Fraction of a country's 
alnd area in the tropics
percent Doppelhoffer et. al (2004)
Terms of Trade growth
Annual Percentage change of 
terms of trade
percent
Authors computation using 
WDI data
Std of Terms of Trade 
growth
Standard deviation of terms of 
trade growth
natural units
Authors computation using 
WDI data
inflation
Annual Percentage Change of 
CPI index
natural log
Authors computation using 
WDI data
Budget Balance (% GDP)
Budget Surplus/Deficit as 
percentage of GDP
percent World Economic Forum
Recipients 
Characteristics
Ties between donors 
and recipients
Dependent Variables
Appendix 1: Description of Variables
Donors Characteristics(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Model OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
NonAlliesAid(% GDP) 1.379 1.264 2.652 1.452 2.314 2.307 3.244 3.146
(2.04)** (1.72)* (1.88)* (0.82) (2.10)** (2.18)** (2.11)** (1.82)*
AlliesAid(% GDP) -4.965 -5.022 -4.403 -3.281 -6.953 -7.108 -7.409 -7.914
(3.52)*** (3.00)*** (2.73)*** (1.31) (3.22)*** (3.31)*** (2.90)*** (2.87)***
log(Initial Per Capita GDP) -0.085 -0.086 -0.089 -0.089 -0.095 -0.095 -0.097 -0.103
(4.49)*** (4.71)*** (3.55)*** (3.28)*** (4.21)*** (4.44)*** (3.98)*** (3.98)***
Dummy for Sub-Saharian Africa -0.152 -0.148 -0.172 -0.165 -0.185 -0.185 -0.201 -0.203
(4.81)*** (4.99)*** (3.80)*** (3.80)*** (4.66)*** (4.78)*** (4.27)*** (4.17)***
Institutional quality (ICRG Index) 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(3.49)*** (3.72)*** (3.03)*** (2.99)*** (3.28)*** (3.51)*** (3.16)*** (3.37)***
Fraction of area in the tropics 0.019 0.019 0.042 0.034 0.004 0.005 0.048 0.060
(0.53) (0.54) (0.79) (0.55) (0.10) (0.13) (0.93) (1.08)
Terms of Trade Growth 0.202 0.200 0.225 0.253 0.235 0.232 0.224 0.219
(1.42) (1.48) (1.41) (1.63) (1.54) (1.62) (1.49) (1.59)
Std of Terms of Trade Growth -0.046 -0.043 -0.034 -0.036 -0.050 -0.050 -0.036 -0.030
(1.21) (1.19) (0.88) (0.99) (1.33) (1.39) (0.92) (0.82)
Constant 0.226 0.226 0.148 0.164 0.200 0.203 0.175 0.190
(1.98)* (2.12)** (0.94) (1.17) (1.53) (1.68)* (1.18) (1.39)
Observations 64 63 58 57 67 67 58 57
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Craigg-Donald Test for Weak iv 125.26 32.65 85.60 45.39
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
before 33rd perc 
and after 66th perc
Appendix 2. Alternative splitting rules for AlliesAid and NonAlliesAid according to UN voting. 
Cross Section Analysis for period 1980-2003.  
Dependent Variable is average annual growth rate of per capita GDP
Splitting Rule Zero corr 33rd percentile 66th percentile(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Aid(% GDP) 0.545 0.060
(2.05)** (0.10)
NonAlliesAid(% GDP) 1.818 2.327 2.411 2.730 2.602
(2.72)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (3.23)*** (2.94)***
AlliesAid(% GDP) -2.168 -2.781 -3.901 -3.617 -3.997
(1.53) (1.97)** (2.12)** (2.03)** (2.30)**
log(Initial Per Capita GDP) 0.054 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.055 0.049
(1.60) (1.29) (1.28) (1.38) (1.27) (1.44) (1.51)
Institutional quality (ICRG Index) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007
(3.55)*** (3.70)*** (3.43)*** (3.66)*** (3.06)*** (3.00)*** (3.35)***
log(inflation) -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.29) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50)
Openness Index -0.048 -0.038 -0.047 -0.050 -0.066 -0.075 -0.054
(1.14) (0.89) (1.02) (1.12) (1.31) (1.46) (1.35)
Budget Balance(% GDP) 0.393 0.247 0.666 0.773 0.731 0.836 0.800
(0.83) (0.53) (1.60) (1.92)* (1.66)* (1.84)* (1.15)
Constant -0.595 -0.550 -0.399 -0.463 -0.396 -0.411 0.000
(2.01)** (1.94)* (1.42) (1.77)* (1.52) (1.51) (.)
Observations 217 217 174 173 144 143 143

















F Test of Excluded iv 8.38  119.66 112.58
Craigg-Donald Test for Weak iv 162.81
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2SLS 2SLS System of eq OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Appendix 3. Robustness Check. Panel Analysis for period 1970-2003.  





















Model(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Aid(% GDP) -0.641 -2.309
(0.93) (1.30)
NonAlliesAid(% GDP) 2.759 3.225 3.765 4.014 3.124
(2.17)** (2.61)*** (2.35)** (2.45)** (1.71)*
AlliesAid(% GDP) -7.714 -8.293 -10.329 -10.231 -9.499
(3.18)*** (3.41)*** (2.99)*** (3.02)*** (2.82)***
log(Initial Per Capita GDP) -0.094 -0.113 -0.114 -0.114 -0.122 -0.120 -0.122
(3.00)*** (3.22)*** (3.49)*** (3.76)*** (3.90)*** (3.84)*** (3.52)***
Dummy for Sub-Saharian Africa -0.178 -0.156 -0.230 -0.236 -0.244 -0.247 -0.235
(3.20)*** (2.90)*** (4.10)*** (4.47)*** (4.34)*** (4.36)*** (3.61)***
Institutional quality (ICRG Index) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
(3.25)*** (3.55)*** (3.22)*** (3.46)*** (3.52)*** (3.50)*** (4.56)***
Fraction of area in the tropics -0.044 -0.030 0.033 0.036 0.051 0.050 0.046
(0.58) (0.42) (0.39) (0.46) (0.62) (0.61) (0.63)
Terms of Trade Growth 0.379 0.288 0.295 0.294 0.256 0.267 0.259
(1.45) (1.14) (1.13) (1.21) (1.04) (1.09) (1.39)
Std of Terms of Trade Growth 0.099 0.093 0.068 0.065 0.056 0.056 0.060
(0.88) (0.84) (0.60) (0.62) (0.52) (0.52) (0.60)
Constant -0.207 -0.081 -0.110 -0.111 -0.065 -0.079 -0.066
(0.66) (0.28) (0.35) (0.38) (0.22) (0.27) (0.24)
Observations 71 71 67 67 67 67 67

















F Test of Excluded iv 5.82 213.97  109.19
Craigg-Donald Test for Weak iv 59.90
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2SLS 2SLS System of eq OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Appendix 4. Cross Section Analysis for period 1990-2003.  




















 and Untied 
Aid
ModelAlliesAid 0.4662 0.4783
AlliesAid Fitted 0.0892 0.0155
AlliesAid 0.4856 0.6081
AlliesAid Fitted -0.0251 -0.016
Appendix 5: Correlation Matrices
A. Cross Section Database (1980-2003)
NonAlliesAid
Non Allies   Aid 
Fitted
B. Panel Database (1970-2003)
NonAlliesAid
Non Allies   Aid 
Fitted